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Faces, Interfaces, Screens: Relational Ontologies of Framing,
Attention and Distraction
By Ingrid Richardson 
This paper considers the prevalence of screens in day-to-day life – from the
televisual and cinematic to the many computer and mobile screens encountered
in both domestic and public spaces – and suggests that each of these encounters
has its own corporeal and interfacial modality. More specifically, the discussion
will explore the relational and frontal ontologies of the face and the screen
interface, focusing on the specific body-technology relations to emerge from our
corporeal or somatic incorporation of television, computers and mobile screens.
In particular, I will suggest that our engagement with media screens at a
perceptual and corporeal level can be theorised by way of a phenomenological
method that is supplemented by a critical understanding of the various
ontological tropes and “body-metaphors” that are deeply embedded in our
experience of screen interfaces. This focus on the perceptual and metaphorical
aspects of the body-screen – and more specifically, face-screen – relation, can
provide some insights into the historical and ontological affinity between faces,
windows, frames and screens, and the complex ways we “turn” to them with
varying degrees of attention and distraction. Finally, I aim to show how this
affinity is challenged at a fundamental ontic and perceptual level by our
experience of contemporary new media and mobile screens.
In its phenomenological focus, drawing from the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty
and post-phenomenologist Don Ihde, my approach is framed within the broad
premise that every human-technology relation is also a body-tool relation, and
as such every merger with technology invokes certain kinds of being-in-the-
world, and particular ways of knowing and making that world. Such a perspective
considers the screen interface as quite literally an aspect of our corporeal
schematics; that is, through routine use screens have become part of the
dynamic arrangement of our embodied experience. A corollary to this approach is
the notion that  our engagement with screens and interfaces is medium specific,
such that each screen modality – whether televisual, computer or mobile –
effects a different mode of embodiment, a different way of “having a body.”
In Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual and what I would call artifactual epistemology, the
corporeal schema, or our lived experience of perceptual reach and bodily
boundaries, is always-already “extendible” through artifacts and technologies.
Tools are not conceived as merely perceptual attachments or extensions, but
rather our corporeal schemata dilate to make room for instrumentality. This
coupling of tools and bodies is effectively articulated by the term
intercorporeality, a word that describes the irreducible relation between technics,
embodiment, knowledge and perception. As Merleau-Ponty famously claimed, the
body “applies itself to space like a hand to an instrument” (Primacy of Perception
5), an “application” that depends as much on the specificities of perception and
bodily movement as it does on the materiality of the tool-in-use. It is our somatic
openness to the “stuff” of our environment that allows us to incorporate
technologies and equipment into our own corporeal organisation.
Yet the incorporation of screens into our corporeal schemata is also determined in
part by cultural, environmental, spatial and historical specificities – by the
habitudes of practice that have developed within the contextures of everyday life.
Thus, for example, as television theorists such as David Morley have argued,
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“television” and “home” have redefined each other (Morley, in Jenks). Early
conventional television architecturally transformed the living area of the home
into a “viewing space,” requiring modifications to how the body was habitually
positioned and mobilised, while over the past decade the proliferation of
televisual entertainment technologies within the home has effected new ways of
carpentering the built environment, to literally “make room” for new media
spaces, by way of open-plan design or the designation of a cinematic “niche” for
the home theatre or entertainment centre. As media theorists Silverstone and
Hirsch suggest, the actual location of the TV set has implications for our
embodied and spatial experience of both the interface and immediate
environment, including our placement and proximity among other viewers and
domestic objects. Such studies have shown that the televisual medium
dynamically transforms the environment of reception and the embodied
experience of domestic screen perception.
More recently, a number of mobile phone theorists have provided deep
ethnographic and comparative analyses of mobile phone cultures and practices,
and the way that the mobile screen, as a media content, gaming and
communications interface, is deployed (and embodied) differently in countries
such as Japan, China, Korea and Australia (Hjorth; Choi; Bell). As Choi notes,
drawing on the work of Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, there are significant cultural
disparities in the performance of self – and the correlative “face-negotiation”
strategies required – that become embedded in mobile media cultures and mobile
phone practices. Thus, for example, in Japan, there is an explicit distinction
between honne – “true feelings” that are kept to oneself – and tatemae – one’s
public face, while in Korea, nunchi – the ability to “read” and interpret others’
faces and social cues – is regarded as an essential skill. Choi argues that such
face-negotiations and customs (among other techno-cultural specificities), are
intrinsic to mobile phone use, revealed by both the subtle and more palpable
cultural differences evident in the everyday “work” of image sharing, texting and
gaming. Although cultural differences pertaining to screen engagement is not the
purview of this paper, there remains much interpretive analysis to be done
identifying such disparities in the micro-practices of mobile phone embodiment,
and the way both collective and personalised mobile media practices are in fact a
complex coalescence of cultural, cognitive, material and somatic factors.
As Don Ihde suggests, the body-technology relation is our fundamental
ontological condition, yet each of these relations that define and transform our
techno-perceptual experience is non-neutral, specific to context and culture. In
his analysis of our prolific visualising technologies – from domestic, personal and
public screens to highly sophisticated scientific apparatuses – Ihde documents
how the body and instrument form a temporary collusive entity that apprehends
or handles the world in specific ways. In each case, he writes, the mediation
must be made to “fit” the body, and in particular there exists a consonance
between the device and our “face-to-face capacities”:
The mediated presence… must fit, be made close to my
actual body position and sight.… What is seen must be seen
from or within my visual field, from the apparent distance in
which discrimination can occur regarding depth, etc., just as
in face-to-face relations. But the range of what can be
brought into this proximity is transformed by means of the
instrument. (Technology and the Lifeworld 72)
Ihde’s analysis allows us to consider the ways in which different media and
screen interfaces effect different kinds of perceptual and communicative reach,
though for the most part our apprehension and orientation to the interface is
determined by the need to see and therefore “face” it. As I will suggest,
however, while our perceptual engagement with screen interfaces is often
predicated on this face-to-face configuration, contemporary televisual and mobile
screens frequently work to confound or at least problematise this relation.
This distinction between various body-screen modalities explicitly acknowledges
the concept of medium specificity, a term originating from the work of
technological determinists Marshall McLuhan (Understanding Media) and Harold
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Innis (Bias of Communication). Medium specificity describes the fact that specific
media have specific spatial, temporal and socio-cultural effects, determining
particular conditions of possibility for the way meaning is made. While Innis is
concerned with the historical breadth and evolving political effects of
communications technologies on cultural formation and social organisation,
McLuhan claims that all media are extensions of the body: they alter our sensory
access to the world, determining and organising our experience, our forms of
knowledge, indeed the very structure of perception. In McLuhan’s understanding
of medium specificity, each communication medium works to “fix” particular
sensory ratios, stipulating forms of knowledge and orchestrating the structure of
perception by “attuning” our sensory equipment to absorb reality in medium-
specific ways (Carey284). While acknowledging McLuhan’s insights, rather than
use the idea of “sensory ratio” I would describe the screen-body coupling in
more relational terms as technosomatic involvement, a concept which can
recognise the medium-specific ordering of sense-perception and bodily
orientation, but goes beyond the confines of “sensory ratios” applied to specific
media, to include the way in which the body-media relation is also moored by
sedimented cultural habits, body-metaphors and tropes surrounding our
engagement with screens, and the impact of the situated or built environment
upon that engagement.
Thus, for example, we often refer to the difference between our engagement with
conventional broadcast television screens and interactive computer screens in
terms of how we choose to position the body when attending to the screen; that
is, when watching television we “lean back” in contrast to the “lean forward” body
posture demanded of interactive screen media, where there is an imperative to
face the screen more proximally and directly. This describes the variable
embodied orientation we have towards different kinds of media interfaces, and
the immersive investment of the eyes, ears and hands required of interactive
screens. That is, the location of screens and bodies in the built environment, and
the dimensionality, functionality and interfacial specificities of such screens,
partially determines our degrees of attention, practices of viewing, the spatial
arrangements of screen engagement, and one’s mode of technosomatic
involvement and facial posturing within it. In what follows, I will futher explore
the body’s involvement with screen media as quite literally mediatropic,
suggesting that both body and screen are imbricated in a number of complex
ontological and embodiment metaphors. If we remember that the combining form
–trope indicates an affinitive turn towards something, then screen interfaces can
be said to have had significant “tropological” effects on our corporeal schematics;
our modes of embodiment “turn towards” specific technologies and media
interfaces. When we use the expression “glued to the screen,” for instance, we
interpret our eyes as facial and sensory limbs entering into an intimate and tele-
tactile relationship with the screen. Indeed, the explicit goal of media designers in
general is to render the screen “sticky” as a measure of viewer adhesion
(Manovich 161).
The embeddedness of corporeal metaphors in our perception and experience of
the world is investigated in some detail by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in
their two collaborative works Metaphors We Live By and Philosophy in the Flesh.
Lakoff and Johnson claim that a range of embodiment and ontological metaphors
are embedded in all our experiences. They categorise these metaphors as
ontological metaphors — or more specifically as entity, substance and container
metaphors. They write:
We experience ourselves as entities, separate from the rest
of the world — as containers with an inside and an outside.
We also experience things external to us as entities — often
also as containers with insides and outsides. We experience
ourselves as being made up of substances — e.g., flesh and
bone — and external objects as being made up of various
kind of substances — wood, stone, metal, etc. (Metaphors
58)
In identifying the crucial work of metaphor upon the body in The Production of
Space, Lefebvre suggests that metaphors are not simply figures of speech, but
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rather they decipher the world into that which is “sayable” or “susceptible to
figuration”; in so doing, acts of metaphorisation take as their point of departure a
“body metamorphosed” (Lefebvre 139-140). Thus all bodies are caught within a
complex web of analogies and conceptual metaphors. Metaphors, then, are the
extension of our corporeality into the world: only that which can be metaphorised
qua embodiment — interpreted in terms of our complex body-model — is realised
or made real. The way in which Lakoff and Johnson consider the figural and
material projection of our bodies in-the-world is also conceptually akin to the
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology of being which posits a plastic and changeable
relationship between body-subject and the equipmental environment.
For Lakoff and Johnson, humans (and animals in general) have a front and a
back, or a face and behind, and we embed this ontology or understanding of
being-in-the-world into the constitution of spaces and objects in our worldly
environment (Philosophy in the Flesh 34). There are many instances of this
frontal ontology in our use of technologies and the way in which we navigate
them. For example, the standard GUI on a computer screen such as Windows
Explorer is configured in such a way that we experience our progression through
directories as forward and back, in and out, up and down. These common
navigational and browser spatialities, along with other body metaphors adapted
to virtual spaces are clearly and quite simply based in our bodies’ engagement
with the world. Importantly, although not of apparent relevance to Lakoff and
Johnson, these somatological schemas are not just outcomes of physiology, they
are also culturally specific, and vary from culture to culture (Hefferon). [1] Yet it
seems that in a more general sense, as humans we project fronts and backs onto
objects, and habitually designate the “face” as the aspect with which we interact,
because we ourselves face them. Lakoff and Johnson write:
The concepts front and back are body-based. They make
sense only for beings with fronts and backs. If all beings on
this planet were uniform stationary spheres floating in some
medium and perceiving equally in all directions, they would
have no concepts of front and back. But we are not like this
at all. Our bodies are symmetric in some ways and not in
others. We have faces and move in the direction in which we
see. Our bodies define a set of fundamental spatial
orientations that we use not only in orienting ourselves, but
in perceiving the relationship of one object to another.
(Philosophy in the Flesh 34)
Clearly most of our communication technologies are oriented in this way, and
moreover, even when their purpose is not to provide visual images, they more
often than not still have “faces” from which to read information displays. While
there is no doubt that we have a primarily “frontal” relationship with the screen,
this is not to say that we have no association with the “backs” of such devices,
although these interactions are for the most part brief and functional, that is, for
the purpose of connection, or negotiating an effective relationship with the front.
We thus have an affinity with the body of the screen simply by virtue of the fact
that human bodies and screens have “fronts” and “backs” and “face” each other.
It is this screen-face consonance which perhaps best explains the phenomenon of
parasociality, and the common behaviour of reacting towards televisions and
computers “as if” the latter represent “real people” and “real places” (Reeves and
Nass). [2] Indeed, the similitude of the TV and computer box with the human
head or eyes (see figures below) is another clear example of this perceived
consonance at work.
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Computer Head wallpaper for the Blackberry Storm [3]
Image from Weinberg-Clark photography client website [4]
Image from Security Reality website [5]
This front-to-front relationship is one that we have with screens in general. In
most if not all cases the screen is a frame of limited dimensions within our own
physical space, while the body’s frontal relationship with the apparatus varies
between media depending on what Manovich calls “viewing regimes” (96). With
cinema, for example, the viewer is at the outset fully frontal to the exclusion of
all diversions, focusing entirely on the screen. In the optimum situation the
boundary or interface between body and cinematic apparatus dissolves, a merger
which manifests a change in orientation from being “in front of” to being “within,”
an effect which is achieved by several factors: the size of the screen, the
darkness of the theatre, and not least by surround sound. Front-to-front
orientations are therefore not achieved by vision alone; in many situations, when
facing a moving image we would expect that sound would also approach us from
this direction, but the effect of surround or stereophonic sound is to embrace the
body in such a way that the frontal relationship with the screen is at least
partially compromised. In the case of television — with perhaps the home theatre
an exception — the face-to-face relationship between the body and the set is
somewhat more informal and less disciplined; viewers can look away to the
familiarity of their domestic surroundings, move about or leave the room, or they
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can be visually and aurally attentive or inattentive to varying degrees, by muting
the sound, zapping through channels, talking on the phone or conversing with
co-watchers, and reading or engaging in other activities. In other words, the
facial and sensory dedication we apply to media screens varies according to the
mode of technosomatic involvement demanded by both the interface and the
cultural, experiential and material contextures.
Thus although in a general sense as-bodies we clearly have a frontal and
gravitational ontology that impacts upon the way in which we perceive and
navigate screens, the emergent body-tool relation we have with mobile screens
has seen a number of adjustments to this corporeal schematic. For example, the
various postures surrounding mobile phone photography, the practice of
“sharing” one’s screen with others, or more simply developing habitual skills,
such as becoming adept at texting while walking. In these cases the often
dedicated frontal orientation we have towards larger screens becomes
compromised both by our own mobility, the size and resolution of the screen, and
the interrupted nature of mobile phone use. In their study “Everyday Practices
with Mobile Video Telephony” Kenton O’Hara, Alison Black and Matthew Lipson
[6] examine the medium specificity of video phoning, revealing that a different
set of somatic adjustments is needed.
Of most interest in O’Hara et al’s study is the ergonomic incompatibility between
moving bodies and mobile video phones, and the often uncomfortable fit between
facial and visual attention, voice/video communication, macromobility (walking)
and micromobility (adjusting the position and orientation of the phone). For
example, using the videophone feature requires a return to a more visually
determined face-to-face orientation with the screen, i.e. holding the phone out at
arm’s length with the screen directly – and fixedly – in front of the face. This
necessitates use of the speaker phone, such that both the screen display and the
usually private voice communication becomes public (875-876). In some cases
this means that the proper boundaries between public and private cannot be
maintained – both in terms of intruding voices and images into another’s
personal space (on a bus, for example), and in terms of exposing both sides of
one’s own private communication by varying the customary (aural) and intimate
somatic mode of mobile phone communication. O’Hara et al note that while
recipients of a video call could put the phone down and use the hands-free
speaker “it was considered rude” to create a visual asymmetry between speakers
such that they were no longer communicating screenface-to-screenface (878).
For these reasons participants in their study used videophoning only in particular
situations – for the most part, video calls were made when the phone would be
“shared” amongst a group of friends, or for consolidating “special relationships”
that required dedicated face-to-face time even when not co-present (873). In
other words, unlike the casual brevity of the text message or spontaneity of voice
calls, it would seem videophoning is often designated for calls of some import
that require a more deliberate attentiveness to one’s somatic involvement, and
the displaying of one’s face to another.
Another interesting entry-point into the body- and face-screen relation is by
considering one of the more common metaphors of the screen — that of the
frame or “window-on-the-world.” The ontological and cultural significance of the
window and the frame cannot be overstated; as Anne Friedberg comments, the
frame is perceived as “the decisive structure of what is at stake” (The Virtual
Window 14), while for Vivian Sobchack it is both a “lived logic” and itself “an
organ of perception” (Address of the Eye 134, cited in Friedberg 16). The
comparison between screen and window as framing devices is easily made and
understood — the frames of window and screen are similarly rectangular, they
can be similarly interpreted as membranes between “inside” and “outside,” and
what one sees through the frame is a portion of the world in space and time (in
the case of television, for example, this is often aimed towards a “realistic”
depiction of a place/event in a parody of the scene-through-a-window). It is
worth examining in some detail the portrayal of the screen as frame or window,
and how such a rendering clearly instantiates a particular kind of relationship to
the body, its orientation, and its somatic involvement with/in the medium.
The window-on-the-world is a trope emergent from linear perspective. In the
space of linear perspective the observer looks at the world as if through a
window. The “tropological effect” of linear perspectival vision and the “window-
TRANSFORMATIONS
http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_18/article_05.shtml[20/11/2012 3:37:11 PM]
on-the-world” can be characterised by the way visibility and light have come to
stand for truth, belief and knowability. The corporeal effect here is clearly one
which elevates visual perception and the eyes as those organs which can most
accurately deliver the truth of something. As Romanyshyn argues, this put the
hegemony of the eye firmly in place, such that “Alberti’s window, which begins as
an artistic device, thus becomes a style of thought, a cultural perception, a way
of imagining the world… The window as membrane becomes the boundary, the
place where the world is divided into exterior and interior domains” (Romanyshyn
69). Romanyshyn insists, then, that the window of perspectival vision set up an
ontological boundary and distance between the space of the observer and the
space of the observed. Significantly, in the case of Alberti’s window (see figure
below), the viewer’s bodily movement is restricted or even absented by the
device, in that the grid needs to remain directly between the scene and the line
of sight: the body is at the service of vision and facial orientation; it is an eye-
body, with every other perceptual register absent.
Alberti's Grid - c.1450 [7]
In technosomatic terms, we might consider the window, frame and screen as
perceptually inter-familiar, exhibiting a kind of ontological consonance; that is, as
Friedberg notes, like the window, the screen and its frame “holds a view in
place”; it becomes, like the window, a transformative aperture in architectural
space, altering the materiality of our built environment and opening surfaces up
to a new kind of conceptual and metaphoric “ventilation” (Friedberg 1). The
screen-as-window, then, sets up a particular kind of corporeal trope: to look out
a window and to view a screen, at the imperative of the eyes and face one’s
body must be turned towards the apparatus. As such, to remain visually attached
the body is rendered immobile. Indeed for Manovich, this fixedness typifies a
bodily inertia and sensory deprivation that has been and remains a predisposition
of “the Western screen-based apparatus” in general (Manovich 104). This
tendency can be traced from Alberti’s perspectival window and Renaissance
monocular perspective, through to Kepler’s camera obscura, nineteenth century
camera lucida and contemporary cinema: in all of these interfaces, he argues, the
body is fixed in space (Manovich 104-105). Although the dynamic screens of
cinema and television might be said to virtually transport the viewer, Manovich
argues that this mobility is had at the cost of the “institutionalised immobility” of
the body of the spectator (107), in the form of the silent seated rows of movie-
goers or the domestic couch-reclining TV viewer. [8] Importantly, this distinction
between the virtually mobile or tele-active eye-body and the stationary physical
body is made by way of the screen-as-window metaphor. Within this metaphor
the eyes alone must remain mobile, to traverse and visually “handle” the surface
space of the screen, while the face and body are held captive by the eyes’
attachment. The rectilinear dimensions of the media window — and its
immobilisation of the body in front of the screen — is an instance of the
epistemological containment of knowledge in perspectival vision, today most
familiar through the ubiquitous frame of the screen. Thus by tracing a lineage
from Alberti’s window to contemporary screen technologies such as television and
cinema, we can see the medium specificity of our understanding, our spatial and
somatic perception, and what is often termed our frontal ontology.
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While it is the case that the frontal or frame-ontology of windowed perception
remains as one of the most tenacious interfacial tropes influencing our
understanding of contemporary media today, I would argue that Manovich both
overstates and oversimplifies the resemblance between cinematic and domestic
or personalised screen interfaces (such as television, computer and mobile media
device). Indeed, he suggests that our relationship to the screen has remained
static – that the fictional window of the filmic interface and its technosomatic
requirements can be simply translated into the datascape window of the
computer screen. Although we may move from a public cinematic space to a
domestic space, or from a large screen to a smaller and more isolated personal
screen, our fundamental orientation to the interface and its framing properties
has, for Manovich, remained unchanged.
Yet if we are to understand the technosomatic specificities of contemporary
screen engagement, we need to develop a more nuanced or granular
interpretation of such experiences, with particular insight into the altered
somatic, haptic and facial relations to emerge from our engagement with smaller
and sometimes portable screens. As Friedberg and others have suggested, the
perspectival tropes of window and frame cannot be applied unproblematically to
the computer. In particular, the computer screen is “fractured” and layered,
providing a multiple windowed format that remakes our “visual vernacular”
(Friedberg 3), invoking what Ihde (Postphenomenology) calls a plurivisual mode
of perceptual engagement.
There is no doubt that both our tele-somatic and physically embodied relation to
the personal computer screen is quite different to our experience of both
traditional televisual and cinematic screens in terms of proximity, orientation and
mobility, and not least because we are no longer “lean-back” spectators or
observers but “lean-forward” users. In particular, our face-to-face relation to the
computer and mobile screen is intimate, up close, and involves the negotiation
and manipulation of a networked screen-space via the keyboard, mouse,
touchscreen or other device (Friedberg 231), setting up both a “distributed
presence” and an interactive circuit of eyes, ears, hands and interface with a
range of “handy” peripheral devices. Moreover, laptops and handhelds can be
carried with us, in our hands, pockets or bags or on our laps, effectively
mobilising the body- and face-screen relations into the workspace, pedestrian
space, vehicular space and the numerous public spaces of the urban
environment. As Toni Robertson points out, many new kinds of digital media
depend on the phenomena of human motility and mobility, such that we
ourselves become their “intimate mobile hosts.”
Nevertheless, it seems that what has remained consistent through all these
screen modalities is the mediatrope of the window, vis-à-vis the model of the
frame and its frontal ontology. Friedberg writes: “the metaphor of the window
has retained a key stake in the technological framing of the visual field. The
Windows interface is a postcinematic visual system, but the viewer-turned-user
remains in front of (verstellen) a perpendicular frame” (Friedberg 232). Yet I
would argue that the vacillating degree of attention and distraction particular to
many contemporary screens – particularly mobile handheld screens –
problematises the frame ontology and the perception, eye-behaviour and facially
determined body posture proper to the window metaphor. Indeed, I have already
noted that televisual screens often work to confound the focused attention
usually ascribed to the screen-body relation; the televisual eye is frequently
distracted, both by the exo-televisual environment – the activities and
communicative acts that disrupt the practice of dedicated watching – and in the
latent lateral but ever-ready possibilities of remote control devices and multiple
channels. Rarely is TV enveloped by a zone of inattention — it is always-already
surrounded by other domestic objects and zones of practice within the
collectively realised domestic spaces and spatial topography of the home. In what
follows I will explore this departure further in terms of the oscillating
technosomatic registers of attention, inattention and distraction enacted when
engaging with small mobile screens, and suggest that such engagement
undermines both the facial dedication of the immobilised body deemed typical of
our embodied relation to larger screens, and consequently the frontal ontology of
window and the frame.
In considering the technosomatic registers of attention and distraction particular
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to the screen-body relation, it is useful to determine some general ontological
properties of what Introna and Ilharco call “screen-ness.” In contemporary life
screens are often a primary focus of our attention and concern: they literally
display that which is relevant or worthy of notice. This property of relevance has
little to do with the specific content of any particular screen display; it rather
indicates:
a particular involvement in-the-world in which we dwell and
within which screens come to be screens. It is not up to
anyone of us to decide on the already presumed relevance of
screens; that is what a screen is — a framing of relevance, a
call for attention, a making apparent of a way of living.
(Introna & Ilharco 227)
Introna and Ilharco suggest that screens of all kinds enter our involvement-in-
the-world at the moment we turn them on, at which point we reposition our
attention and “sit down, quit — physically or cognitively — other activities we
may have been performing, and watch the screen” (225). Yet this “frontal”
relationship which is typical of our engagement with most screens — where the
mediums of cinema, television and computer can be said to discipline the body
more or less into a face-to-face interaction — is thoroughly disintegrated by the
mobile media screen. Our interaction with mobile screens is rarely marked by
such dedicated attentiveness; indeed, our “turning towards” them is usually
momentary (checking for a text or missed call) or at most can be measured in
minutes.
Eugénie Shinkle offers an interpretation of our “turning to” screen media across a
spectrum of attention, inattention and distraction, allowing us to consider screens
outside of the strictures of relevance suggested by Introna and Ilharco. She
argues that media and communication technologies institute “material
parameters,” proportions of attention and inattention, by which we measure
varying degrees of “perceptual reach” from objects and others in the world. She
writes:
[T]echnologies are material parameters in the world,
embodied praxes…. Functioning as an embodied agent in the
world requires attention — maintaining objects within the
confines of perceptual reach, holding them at the “correct
distance.” At the same time, however, it also calls for a
certain kind of inattention — a persistent openness to the
world, a subsidiary awareness that is different from
reflection as such. Inattention is not the same thing as
distraction — a scattering or absence of attention — rather,
it refers to the different distances at which we hold the rest
of the perceptual field, including the body. (Gardens, Games
and the Anamorphic Subject)
Thus different types of body-technology relations set up different medium specific
proportions of attention and inattention, including (in)attention to one’s own
body. In the case of perspectival vision, Shinkle suggests, the working or
perceiving body is concealed in the interface, as the subject is rendered a
disembodied eye/I; by contrast, and against the notion that the body is an
immobilized eye-body in its engagement with contemporary screens, we could
argue that the face-screen, hand-eye-ear-mouse-screen interface or the hand-
eye-ear-remote control arrangement work as the preferred modalities of
televisual, computer and mobile screen use. In particular, our use of handheld
screens when we are on-the-move further complexifies the body-tool corporeal
schema particular to screen and televisual media; our relationship with the
mobile phone as a multi-sensory device which can be used either as a dedicated
aural or visual medium, for example, can effectively shift eye-behaviour from a
continual fixed-ness on the screen to a sporadic, oscillating and context-
dependent mode of viewing. In such circumstances the dedicated frontal
orientation we have towards screens becomes compromised by our own mobility,
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the screen size and resolution, and the interrupted nature of mobile phone use.
There are many examples of the ways that mobile media screens challenge
conventional screen-body and screen-face relations, including image-sharing
practices, location-based and casual gaming, the practice of posting text or
image content to urban screens, or simply the more mundane activities of talking
and texting. In an environment of proliferating handsets it is relevant to examine
the perceptual specificity of our interactions with, and experiences of, the mobile
phone, and the ways in which the prioritisation of modes of use (listening to
music, watching TV, film-making and editing, photography, web browsing,
gaming, video-phoning, texting and media-messaging) reflect different
relationships between users, bodies, content, handsets, and the physical
environment or spatial context. Indeed, if each new mobile media device can be
considered in Merleau-Ponty’s (Phenomenology of Perception) terms a “fresh
instrument” which dilates our corporeal being accordingly, are we learning a new
range of collective bodily skills, spatial perceptions, postures and habits?
Although in a general sense we may have a frontal and gravitational ontology
that impacts upon the way in which we perceive and navigate screens, the
emergent body-tool relation we have with mobile screens has seen adjustments
to this corporeal schematic; mobile phone photography, for instance, could be
said to have impacted on the nature of face-to-face communication across both
screen and co-present interactions.
It has been noted that the mobile camera phone has altered everyday
photographic practices in terms of its informal status as a camera and perpetual
photo-readiness, enabling the capture of immediate and often intimate objects
and events (Okabe and Ito). Users will often share photos just taken or received
with others in face-to-face interaction, by physically showing or passing around
one’s phone to friends, rather than sending them through the mobile phone
network. This practice effectively creates a hybridised mode of communication
that cuts across mediated and co-present or face-to-face contexts. Indeed,
mobile media is increasingly cross-platform, such that the mobile device can be
used to browse the web, check email, post messages to screens in cafes and
pubs around the world (see, for example Wiffiti [9]), or more recently, the
Twitter [10] phenomenon allows the mobile user to either contribute to or access
an “ambient flow of information” – primarily via “what-are-you-doing?” updates
concerning friends, coworkers or celebrities. Each new mobile application, it
seems, works to further coalesce urban, online and mobile screens, effecting
increasingly hybridized, networked, distributed and mediated modalities of
interaction.
Mobile media also elicit variable levels of attention and inattention that shift
between actual and telepresent space, partially depending on the demands of the
immediate environment and the extent to which the interface becomes ready-to-
hand in a Heideggerian sense (i.e. its function and usability recede from explicit
awareness). Thus one’s own technosoma may “behave” in ways that accord with
(or deviate from) consensual and recognised modes of being-on-the-phone, such
as stopping, bowing the head to conceal the face and reduce audibility, shielding
one’s mouth with the hand to define a provisional private space, or deliberately
not altering one’s trajectory or visual/facial orientation, and directing one’s gaze
into the middle distance, as is the case with the more blatant Bluetooth
pedestrian. To borrow from Erving Goffman’s useful analysis of pedestrian traffic,
in such responses the mobile phone pedestrian articulates a specific and
recognised type of “gestural prefigurement” or “body-gloss,” which intentionally
displays to others a state of being-on-the-phone (Relations in Public 31-32). The
various postures and embodied actions particular to mobile phone use in public
places, and the correlative dynamics of attention-inattention, are quite specific to
the body-mobile relation which has emerged throughout the last decade. Here,
the typical “phone-face” we customarily adopt when on the phone (eyes looking
into the middle distance, with attention focused on the interiority of one’s aural
sensory perception) becomes also a public face with which the gestural body is
aligned, a face-and-body that says “I’m on the phone.” Similarly, the activity of
casual gaming or noodling with one’s mobile media device while waiting for a
friend or at a bus stop becomes another way of managing one’s alone-ness in
public spaces, enacting a particular kind of “face-work” in Goffman’s (Interaction
Ritual) sense, while at the same time maintaining an “environmental knowing,”
or crucial peripheral awareness of one’s spatial surroundings in readiness for the
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busy-ness of life to resume. The transient and non-dedicated attentiveness
required by the small screen and casual game – you can “switch off” but “not
totally” – allows the user to avert their gaze from others and so cooperate in the
tacit social agreement of non-interaction among strangers. As I have suggested,
the micromobilities of the body here quite literally enact a mobile-specific
mediatrope – inclined metaphorically, corporeally, communicatively and
gesturally towards the mobile media device.
On a macro-perceptual scale, location-based games integrate play and game
interaction into the patterns of quotidian life and peripatetic movement. In
location-based gaming ventures such as Mogi [11] in Japan and Cipher Cities
[12] in Brisbane, Australia, pedestrian gamers integrate their game-play with
their everyday trajectories through the city as they hunt and trade virtual
objects, build do-it-yourself mobile adventures in their own neighborhood or
familiar streetscape, and message other active users. Such games create a
network or connective sensibility in which the mobile phone, web, community of
participants and built environment merge, and potentially work to seamlessly
combine the corporeal schematics of actual and virtual spaces as they are
actively negotiated on-the-move. Friedberg (173) comments that the visual
systems of the pedestrian viewer and the cinema or television viewer are entirely
different – the first is itinerant and in-the-world, requiring “bodily, haptic,
phenomenological perception” whereas for the second the “itinerary becomes
framed,” and the body’s immobility is “compensated for” by the moving images
on the screen. In contrast, the mobile phone – and in particular, location-based
gaming practices – effect a new technosomatic arrangement which brings
together the peripatetic mobility of the user, the mobility of that which is framed,
and the mobility of the frame itself. Here, the face-to-face or frontal ontology of
the screen is quite literally minimised, and the face-screen relation is intermittent
and partial; attentive, inattentive and distracted in varying degrees, and
absorbed within the broader technosomatic arrangements of the urban
environment.
Given the increasing prevalence of screens in everyday life, it is critical that we
understand the corporeal dynamics of contemporary screen use, the historical
legacy of the larger screen, and especially the more recent technosomatic effects
of the now ubiquitous mobile device. Throughout this paper I have considered
the various body-metaphors attributable to screens, and the problematic
assumption that the window and frame are perceptually homologous to either
the televisual, computer or itinerant small screen. The “telic inclination” of the
screen is not uniform, linear or continuous, or necessarily determined by the
perspectival trope and its demands for a fixed face-to-face relationship. With a
more nuanced phenomenological analysis of the micro-practices surrounding our
experience of contemporary screens, we can more effectively interpret the way
mobile devices in particular modify our communicative and playful practices,
remediate our experience of media content, and insinuate themselves into our
ways of being-in-the-world. The mobile media device, to a degree at least as
significant as the cinematic, televisual and computer screen, presents a
significant shift in the relational ontology of body and technology. This relation is
perhaps more intimate, ever-present and affective than any we have thus far
experienced. In a very fundamental way the mobile interface modifies what we
pay attention to, what we “turn to” and face (and turn away from) in the
everyday lifeworld, and the modalities and durée of that attentiveness. What we
need, then, are ways of thinking through new body-screen metaphors that more
effectively capture the distracted, discontinuous, motile, peripatetic and tangible
nature of mobile media engagement.
In this paper I have sought to provide a history, method and context for such
interpretive work. As theorists such as Don Ihde and Anne Friedberg have
pointed out, ways of encountering the world, both mediated and unmediated,
entail conventions of sense-perception and collective corporeal habits that are
not innate or given, but culturally, materially and somatically specific. Each new
interfacial modality stipulates its own gathering of soma and technique, its own
technosomatic routines. In this light, I have suggested that our contemporary
media experience unhinges preceding face- and body-screen couplings. That is,
the particular technosomatic configurations of screen experience across
televisual, computer and mobile interfaces, when critically examined in terms of
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their medium specific effects, can offer some insight into how such effects work
to confound and reshape historically sedimented face-to-interface conventions.
 
Ingrid Richardson is Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Creative Technologies
and Media at Murdoch University. Her broader research interests include
philosophy of science and technology, new and interactive media theory,
phenomenology, visual ethnography, haptics and embodied interaction. She
has published book chapters and journal articles on the cultural and
corporeal effects of mobile media, video phoning, digital and mobile
games, blogging, urban screens, virtual reality, biomedical imaging, and
technologies for sustainability. More recently, Ingrid’s published research
has focused on the way mobile media have infiltrated and impacted upon
screen cultures in everyday life.
 
Endnotes
1. Culturally specific body-orientations are often instilled at a very young
age; for example, in contrast to the dominant Western habit of facing a
new-born baby toward the holder, “Kaluli mothers tend to face babies
outwards so that they can be seen by and see others that are part of the
social group,” habituating a particular orientation to both the maternal and
wider environment (Woodhead et al. cited in Donald and Richardson).
[return]
2. The social and behavioral aspects of this affinity between humans and
television (and more generally computers and new communications media)
is explored in some detail by Reeves and Nass in their study The Media
Equation.
[return]
3. See http://bbstormwallpapers.com/2008/12/04/computer-head-wallpaper
[return]
4. See http://www.weinberg-clark.com
[return]
5. See http://securityreality.wordpress.com/2009/03/30/real-world-network-
security-and-hacking-1st-edition/
[return]
6. O’Hara et al studied 21 participants (13 male and 8 female) in the UK over
five weeks.
[return]
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7. See Russell Naughton (2003) “Drawing Aids to Perspective” 
http://www.acmi.net.au/AIC/DRAWING_MACHINES.html
[return]
8. Interestingly, Manovich claims that this condition of the body’s immobility
can also be traced through the history of communication: “In ancient
Greece, communication was understood as an oral dialogue between
people. It was also assumed that physical movement stimulated dialogue
and the process of thinking… In the Middle ages, a shift occurred from
dialogue between subjects to communication between a subject and an
information storage device, that is, a book. A medieval book chained to a
table can be considered a precursor to the screen that “fixes” its subject in
space” (Manovich 104-105, note 48). The mobile phone and video phone,
although mobilising the communicator according to the imperatives of push
media (the desire for perpetual connectivity), are devices that perhaps
return us to the practice of walking and talking.
[return]
9. See http://www.wiffiti.com/
[return]
10. See http://twitter.com/
[return]
11. See http://www.mogimogi.com/
[return]
12. See http://ciphercities.com/
[return]
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